Case Note by Gabrielle A. Ball
Gabrielle A. Ball's case note examines the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Eaglin v. Eunice Police Department, 2017-1875, p. 1 (La. 6/27/2018); 2018 WL 3154744, where the court held that the prescriptive period for a false imprisonment claim begins to run on the date of arrest.
Case Note by Matthieu Robert
In this case note, Matthieu Robert explores Valero Marketing & Supply Co. v. M/V Almi Sun, Sun, 893 F.3d 290, 291, 2018 AMC 1564, 1565 (5th Cir. 2018), in which the Fifth Circuit held that, under Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act, Valero had not furnished necessaries to the vessel on order of the owner or person authorized by the owner and thus was not entitled to a maritime lien.
Note by Oliver Atticus Kaufman
This note examines the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Panetti v. Davis, 863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2017), where the court held that a petitioner must be granted appointed counsel and funds for expert assistance to prepare for a federal habeas petition under a theory of incompetency.
Note by Collin S. Buisson
This note explains and analyzes the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Juneau v. State ex rel. Department of Health and Hospitals, 2015-1382 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/7/16);197 So. 3d 398. The First Circuit held that the nieces and nephews of a personal injury claimant who died while his claim was still pending could not recover proceeds from his suit, since their mother—the claimant's sister—predeceased the claimant.
Note by Marjorie P. Dennard
This note explores the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2016), in which the Court held that the state of Texas had standing to challenge the EEOC's recent Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Response by Patricia L. Judd
In this Response to Sam F. Halabi's Article International Intellectual Property Shelters, Patricia L. Judd poses a "billion dollar question": Can the shelters Halabi identifies in his piece change the international intellectual property rights landscape in any meaningful way?
Essay by Nicolas Cornell
In Third-Party Beneficiaries and the Nature of Contract, Nicholas W. Sage raised some concerns with the proposal for revising our understanding of contractual obligation championed by Nicolas Cornell's Article The Puzzle of the Beneficiary’s Bargain. In this reply, Cornell responds to Sage's response essay.
Essay by John Infranca
In Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System, Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand challenges the assumption–implicit in the fast-growing legal literature on the “sharing economy”–that companies in this sector operate in the manner of traditional firms. Framing the sharing economy as a “nascent form of a coordinated market economy,” Dyal-Chand calls for regulation rooted in a deeper understanding of the institutions–both the technological platforms most commonly associated with the sharing economy (Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and their ilk) and a burgeoning collection of more organic and democratic organizations—that shape this economy. This short Response focuses on the potential of this second category of institutions to achieve a more equitable distribution of the economic benefits of the sharing economy.
Essay by Dave Fagundes
New Orleans’ Mardi Gras celebration is justifiably famous as a city-wide bacchanal centered on extravagant parades. But beneath the atmosphere of lawlessness, a surprising degree of order prevails that stops the gatherings from descending from revelry into chaos. This brief Essay explores the spoken and unspoken rules of New Orleans’ Carnival season, focusing on how both law and social norms combine to manage access to and use of the public property along the city’s major parade routes.
Essay Response by Nicholas Sage
In The Puzzle of the Beneficiary’s Bargain, Nicolas Cornell describes a jurisprudential puzzle concerning contract law’s treatment of third-party beneficiaries and contends that, to resolve the puzzle, we must radically revise our understanding of contractual obligation. This Response raises some difficulties for the revised understanding of contractual obligation that Cornell proposes.