Article by Angela M. Bohmann
In its 1977 decision in Shaffer v. Heitner the Supreme Court determined that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required all assertions of state court jurisdiction to be tested under the principles established in its earlier decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. Under those principles, for a state to acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant not physically present within its territory, the defendant must have "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" In Shaffer the Supreme Court determined that the same principles should be used to test a state's assertion of in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction. Thus, after Shaffer a state court may exercise in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction only if there exist sufficient ties among the defendant, the state, and the litigation.
The Shaffer decision concerned only the exercise of state court jurisdiction. Nevertheless, because of its conclusion that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction is to be tested under the same constitutional principles as the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, the decision raises issues concerning the in rem jurisdiction of federal courts. Specifically, the decision may require reconsideration by federal courts of their exercise of the traditional admiralty action in rem and the admiralty attachment procedure.
The writer will first outline the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer, focusing on those aspects of the decision relevant to a reconsideration of admiralty in rem jurisdiction. Next, the applicability of Shaffer to the admiralty action in rem and to the admiralty attachment procedure will be treated separately, with the author determining that the latter procedure is more likely to be affected by Shaffer than the former. Finally, the writer will discuss the manner in which the principles of International Shoe would be applied to admiralty proceedings and will conclude that testing admiralty in rem actions under due process principles will in fact have little effect on the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.
About the Author
Angela M. Bohmann. B.S. 1975, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay; J.D. 1978, Boston College Law School. Member of the Bar, Wisconsin.
Citation
53 Tul. L. Rev. 135 (1978)