Paper by Graydon S. Staring
Justice Frankfurter observed that the interstices of procedure contained a great deal of substance. Procedure in a limitation action is permeated with substance. Novel and advanced at the outset, limitation procedure has remained absolutely unique. It combines features of the remedies of interpleader, class action, declaratory judgment, bankruptcy, and the bill of peace, some of which were not available for general application at the time the limitation proceeding was invented, and all of which, at least in combination, present a great potential for substantive advantage.
While touching also upon the procedural treatment of limitation in an ordinary suit for damages, this paper will principally address the procedural features of the limitation action. Even after a century and a quarter, it is not widely understood how complex and subtle are the jurisdictional and procedural implications of the Limitation Act. The principle of concursus established by the Act is the heart of limitation procedure and the chief implement of its substance. Considering the age of the Act, the frequency with which it has been invoked, and the number of rulings on procedural points raised under it, it is surprising how frequently one sees decisions, some of them quite thoughtful, in which doubtful conclusions are expressed without evident awareness of their consequences at other points of the proceedings or their relationship to underlying principle. Some instances may be observed below.
About the Author
Graydon S. Staring. J.D. University of California School of Law. Member, California Bar.
Citation
53 Tul. L. Rev. 1134 (1979)