Article by Xavier Blanc-Jouvan
The word commonly used in France to cover all forms of worker involvement in management decisions is “participation.” If we go beyond the word and try to define a concept, we discover a great deal of uncertainty and imprecision. Even if we ignore the possibility of workers' participation in profits and concentrate on the participation in decisionmaking, we find several methods by which employees or their representatives can play a role in the management of a firm. At the risk of oversimplification, we may consider that there are four main types of participation, all of which are clearly distinguishable.
The first method—and surely the best known in the United States—is through the collective agreement, negotiated at the company or plant level between the employer and one or several unions representing the employees. This method is all the more effective, as the scope of collective bargaining is broader (it may extend to almost any subject) and the contractual provisions are more readily enforceable.
A second method of participation consists of the establishment of various bodies or committees composed of employee representatives (usually elected) who are invited to cooperate with the employer in the decisionmaking process. The extent of a committee's powers may, of course, vary greatly with each particular case. Indeed, the committee's role may range from mere consultation to a full right of veto.
Sometimes, for no good reason, the word “participation” is used to describe a third means of involving employees in management: namely, the inclusion of workers on the boards of large companies. This arrangement can be accomplished either by encouraging stock ownership among employees or by a scheme modeled on the German system of codetermination.
Lastly, there is the possibility of direct and immediate participation by the employees themselves—which may extend from a simple right given to all workers to express their opinion on any matter relating to the management of the enterprise (and, in this way, to influence the decision made by the employer) to a complete system of self-management.
No country practices any one of these methods exclusively. In some countries, all four methods are used together and are regarded as complementary. In other countries, however, one method predominates, to the point of becoming the typical feature of the system of industrial relations in that particular country. The United States, and probably Great Britain, seem to fall in the latter class, because in both of those countries the collective bargaining process enjoys undisputed supremacy. In some other countries, various schemes may be provided for by law and may have comparable importance, but they are skillfully combined and coordinated in such a way that there is practically no overlap. An example of this last type is West Germany, where collective bargaining takes place at the Land level while worker representatives sit on the Supervisory Board (Aufsichtsrat) at the company level, and other representatives elected from among the employees constitute a Works Council (Betriebsrat) endowed with important rights of cooperation at the plant level, and even with the power to enter into agreements on special matters with the employer. The distinctive characteristic of French labor law seems to be that it provides for the four types of participation, but it does not structure their coexistence or clearly distribute the functions among them. All of the four methods exist, not alternatively, but cumulatively. They are not only made available to the parties who wish to make use of them, but are also imposed by law, on a compulsory basis. Hence, the triple result that, taken together, they may constitute an unbearable burden for the employer (and for good management of the firm), their possible collision may create difficulties and give rise to some conflicts, and in any case, the competition among them is an obstacle to the full development of each one individually, so that ultimately none of the schemes can be carried very far.
A partial explanation for the French system can be found in history. Labor unions have long been too weak in France, largely because of their ideological background and their internal divisions, to impose upon the employers a true system of collective bargaining. However, they have been able to exert enough political pressure on Parliament to force the passing of some legislation in favor of employees. At first, this legislation was merely protective and dealt almost exclusively with working conditions. But later legislation imposed some schemes of employee participation: this was done, notably, through the establishment in 1936 of the Workers' Delegates, and, in 1945, of the Works Committees. It is true that in 1936 a law was enacted to foster the negotiation of collective agreements, but it had effect only at the national, regional, or local level within a given industry, and not at the only level at which collective bargaining actually can be regarded as a means of participation, that is, at the company or the plant level. It was not until the 1950's that company or plant agreements were fully recognized by law and started to develop in practice. In the meantime, the concept of having worker directors in large corporations had caught on; although this idea was almost unanimously rejected in the private sector, it had some effect on public enterprises, especially those that had been nationalized after World War II. At this point, three of the methods of participation—collective bargaining, employee representatives, and employee board members—were already in existence, and, in some cases, they had to be applied concurrently.
In the mid-1970's, a special committee was set up to make proposals as to the best ways to improve industrial relations in France. It is no surprise that the committee recommended further steps to be taken simultaneously in the three above-mentioned directions: it recommended an increase in the powers of the Works Committees, the development of collective bargaining at the enterprise level, and the introduction of worker representatives on the supervisory boards of private companies. Although nothing came of these proposals, the philosophy underlying them was not completely abandoned, notwithstanding the political changes which have taken place in France; this appears very clearly from the new legislation passed in 1982 and 1983, which has—at least in theory—profoundly modified the scenery in this respect. Five important statutes have brought significant reforms and broadened the field of participation. But once again, instead of making a choice between the possibilities for employee participation, emphasizing one to the detriment of the others, these statutes have followed the same policy favoring all of the patterns. Indeed, they have even added a new method of participation in the form of an employee “right of expression.”
The use of a variety of devices to attain a single goal raises the question: to what extent is it possible to progress in divergent directions at the same time, and, if one attempts to do so, how far is it possible to progress in any particular direction? To find an answer, we must look at each of the methods of participation as they now exist and function in practice in France.
About the Author
Xavier Blanc-Jouvan. Professor of Law, University of Paris 1.
Citation
58 Tul. L. Rev. 1332 (1984)