Article by David A. Sonenshein
Litigants historically have been entitled to a federal forum when their claims fall within the jurisdiction of a federal court. Indeed, in enacting the removal statute, Congress provided that not only the plaintiffs who bring such actions but also the defendants who must defend against them have a right, in most circumstances, to have a federal court resolve their claims. Although recognized exceptions to this entitlement exist in case of (1) extreme inconvenience, (2) when exercise of federal court jurisdiction is purely discretionary, or (3) when comity or federalism considerations are paramount, Congress has deemed the federal courts, with life-tenured judges who are less subject to the vagaries and pressures of local public opinion, to be an option well worth preserving for the litigant.
For some claims brought under federal law, Congress requires that federal jurisdiction be exclusive. For most legal disputes, however, federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the state courts, and state courts are thus permitted to decide cases that could, at the election of either party, be determined in a federal court. Concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state courts and the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have enabled cases that could be tried in federal courts to be heard, either actually or effectively, in state courts. When concurrent state-federal jurisdiction exists, parties who agree to a state forum cannot complain. But, when a federal court stays or dismisses a federal action appropriately filed in a federal court in order to defer to an essentially identical, earlier-filed claim in a state court, the litigant loses his right to have his case determined in a forum controlled by a life-tenured federal judge. Whenever questions bearing on issues within the exclusive purview of federal jurisdiction are decided by a state court and given conclusive effect in a federal court, more profound problems, beyond the interests of the particular litigants, are implicated.
In 1976, in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, the Supreme Court, for the first time, placed its imprimatur on a federal court's abstention from hearing a case unquestionably within its jurisdiction because the same parties were concurrently litigating the same issues in a state court. Although seemingly limited by the case's rather unusual circumstances, the Court's decision was expanded by the lower courts, which in many cases, abstained from hearing claims within their jurisdiction for little reason other than the mere filing of similar actions by one of the parties in a state court. Even though the Court, in a recent case, has severely limited the ability of federal courts to so abstain, there has been surprisingly little analysis of the policies and implications of this new form of abstention, including its effect on the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. This article will trace the checkered history of the Colorado River abstention doctrine, analyze its shortcomings and benefits, and propose ways to answer the questions that remain unanswered.
About the Author
David A. Sonenshein. Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and External Programs, Temple University School of Law; B.A., Cornell University, 1969; J.D., New York University, 1972.
Citation
59 Tul. L. Rev. 651 (1985)