Admiralty: Conflict of Law on the High Seas—The States and the Death on the High Seas Act

Comment by Steven C. Dittman

In 1919 when Congress was considering enactment of what was to become the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), Justice Harrington Putnam of the Supreme Court of New York wrote that ‘[t]he general purpose of the measure [DOHSA] is to give a uniform right of action in the United States admiralty courts for death by negligent acts occurring on the high seas, or on navigable waters of the United States, including the Great Lakes.’ As Justice Putnam's report to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary acknowledged, the chief shortcoming of existing maritime law with respect to an action for wrongful death was its lack of uniformity. Several years earlier in The Harrisburg, the Supreme Court had held that the general maritime law did not afford an action for wrongful death. In its holding, the Harrisburg Court simply imposed the traditional common-law rule, which denied any cause of action for wrongful death, on maritime law. The Harrisburg did not preclude the application of state statutes to maritime wrongful death actions, and twenty-one years later, in The Hamilton, the Court held that a state statute could be applied to grant recovery for a wrongful death occurring on the high seas. Because the individual state statutes varied greatly with respect to burden of proof, application, and remedy, the desired uniformity was sorely lacking. It was against this backdrop that DOHSA was presented to Congress.

DOHSA, however, has proved to be anything but uniform in either application or judicial interpretation. This comment focuses upon the single issue of whether DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for wrongful deaths occurring on the high seas. As the recent decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham makes clear, when a high seas fatality is at issue, DOHSA preempts the general maritime law wrongful death action that would otherwise be afforded by Moragne v. States Marine Lines. It is not so clear, however, whether DOHSA precludes the availability of an action for wrongful death based upon state wrongful death statutes. Indeed, lower courts are currently divided on this issue. The problems attending this split between judicial authorities are readily manifest. First, if state statutory remedies are available for deaths occurring on the high seas, the goal of uniformity envisioned by DOHSA's draftsmen would be frustrated. Second, permitting resort to state remedies for wrongful deaths on the high seas is anomalous given the displacement of state wrongful death statutes by the Moragne general maritime law remedy in territorial waters. Finally, the extension of state court jurisdiction over deaths on the high seas raises questions concerning the intricate division of judicial power between state and federal courts with respect to maritime causes of action.


About the Author

Steven C. Dittman.

Citation

59 Tul. L. Rev. 1487 (1985)