Comment by Michael A. Berenson
Occasionally Congress enacts legislation to solve a particular problem, then enacts additional legislation for a different but similar purpose, but does not consider the effects of one on the other. This predicament occurred when Congress passed section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act in 1947, but did not amend section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, passed in 1932. The earlier law contained a broad prohibition against the federal courts issuing injunctions in labor disputes, while the later enactment expressly authorized the federal courts to entertain suits for violations of labor contracts.
During the years since 1947, and absent any guidance from Congress, the Supreme Court has attempted to interpret these conflicting statutes. For twenty-three years, the result was an uncertain vacillation that seemed to confuse rather than guide the lower courts. Then, in 1970, the Court settled on an apparently workable formula. In 1976 and again in 1982, the Court narrowed the application of the formula, arguably eviscerating its 1970 decision.
This Comment traces the history of the dilemma and analyzes the cases that led to the current state of the law. The Comment explains the complexity of the present method of resolving the continuing conflict and proposes a statutory solution to the problem.
About the Author
Michael A. Berenson.
Citation
63 Tul. L. Rev. 1681 (1989)