Article by Thomas J. André, Jr.
This Article deals with one of the outgrowths of the internationalization of equity markets: the attempt by U.S. institutional investors (specifically the efforts of California Public Employees' Retirement System, or CalPERS) to impose U.S. governance standards on foreign companies. This Article assesses whether this attempt is likely to be successful with respect to German public companies, given that Germany's equity market and its current form of corporate governance are virtually at the opposite end of the spectrum from what is more familiar to a U.S. audience. After discussing some fundamentals of CalPERS' international initiatives and German corporate law, this Article generally deals with the impenetrable nature of the German markets, the role of the shareholder in the corporate hierarchy, the lack of any hostile takeover activity, and the unique and controversial role of the German banks in the governance process.
About the Author
Thomas J. André, Jr. W.R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law.
Citation
73 Tul. L. Rev. 69 (1998)