Article by Jeffrey O. Cooper
With the expanding number of federal statutes, the theory and practice of statutory interpretation have received renewed scholarly attention in the past decade. Much of the attention has focused on two competing theories of statutory interpretation: textualism, most commonly associated with the jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, and practical reasoning, typically associated with the work of Professors William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, and Philip Frickey, among others. The two theories offer radically different visions of the interpretive process. Textualism posits interpretation as a formalistic process in which consultation of the statutory text and a narrowly defined set of additional sources will yield deterministic results. Practical reasoning, in contrast, views interpretation as a dynamic process in which the judge tests possible interpretations against a variety of possible sources. This Article evaluates textualism and practical reasoning through the lens of the employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which in expansive language bars discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The Article concludes that textualism fails to provide the needed tools to deal sensibly with a broadly worded statute like the Americans with Disabilities Act. And while practical reasoning seems a more promising approach, it fails to take account of the role of precedent, as the focus shifts from the statutory text itself to prior judicial interpretations of the statutory language. In light of this, the Article suggests that some rethinking of the role of precedent in statutory cases may be warranted.
About the Author
Jeffrey O. Cooper. Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis. J.D. University of Pennsylvania; A.B. Harvard University.
Citation
74 Tul. L. Rev. 1207 (2000)