Article by Mark R. Brown
Sovereign immunity supplies state and local governments with a formidable shield, one that commentators have for some time tried to normatively explain. Recent scholarship suggests that sovereign immunity is sound because forced compensation cannot deter government. In short, the argument is that government does not respond to incentives in the same way as profit-driven businesses. Because market-based conclusions cannot be confidently applied to government, forced compensation cannot be explained as a sound deterrent. In this Article, Professor Brown uses the Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation Theory, and related empirical experiments to argue that even irrational government can be deterred through a regime of common law liability.
About the Author
Mark R. Brown. Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.S., University of Dayton; J.D., University of Louisville School of Law; LL.M., University of Illinois School of Law.
Citation
76 Tul. L. Rev. 149 (2001)