Article by Alex Geisinger
Over the past five years law and economics scholarship has embraced the concept of social norms. Norms, or behavioral rules supported by a pattern of informal sanctions, can serve both as a source of law and a tool for effective behavioral change. To use norms in such ways, however, requires a complete understanding of how they form and how they interact with legal standards. To date there have been two theories in the legal literature that attempt to explain how norms form. Both of these theories conceive of norms forming in the traditional rational choice sense from the interaction of self-interested individuals.
This Article argues that rational choice does not explain all norm origin and development. Rather, it argues that rational choice provides only one part of the story of norms. The Article develops a complimentary theory of norm formation based on the notion that people conceive of themselves not just as individuals, but also as members of groups. This “group identity theory” provides a much different picture of norm formation and development than that of rational choice. The Article ultimately examines the implications of this new model for how norms can be used in regulation.
About the Author
Alex Geisinger. Professor of Law, Valparaiso Law School.
Citation
78 Tul. L. Rev. 605 (2004)