Article by Leland Ware
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of affirmative action admissions programs developed by colleges and universities. The rulings in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger will affect admissions policies at virtually all colleges and universities in the United States. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the majority in Grutter ruled that diversity is a compelling governmental interest; the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit a university's reliance on race-conscious admissions policies to advance the institution's interest in securing the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity. The outcome in Grutter was heavily influenced by the majority's interpretation of the strict scrutiny doctrine in academic settings. Relying on academic freedom principles, considerable deference was accorded to the university's educational judgments. As a consequence, the level of scrutiny to which the University's actions were subjected was not as strict as it has been in other contexts.
This Article examines the Supreme Court's decisions in the University of Michigan cases. Part II analyzes the evolution of affirmative action jurisprudence from the Court's 1978 decision in Bakke up to the application of strict scrutiny in Croson and subsequent cases. Part III examines the Court's analysis in Grutter and Gratz, with a particular focus on the strict scrutiny analysis. Part IV examines the effect of academic freedom principles and the doctrine of judicial deference to academic decision making on the outcomes in the Michigan cases. The final Part considers the implications of the rulings in Grutter and Gratz on the continuing affirmative action debate.
About the Author
Leland Ware. Louis L. Redding Professor of Law & Public Policy, University of Delaware.
Citation
78 Tul. L. Rev. 2097 (2004)