Article by Vernon Valentine Palmer and John Levendis
This empirical and statistical study of the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrates that the court has been significantly influenced—wittingly or unwittingly—by the campaign contributions from litigants and lawyers appearing before it. In a statistical sense, campaign donors enjoy a favored status among parties before the court. Facing an aggregate of $1.3 million in political donations in the cases under review, the justices did not find reason to disqualify or recuse themselves.
This study controlled for judicial leanings and the differing philosophical orientations of the justices when no money was involved and used this baseline to compare judicial voting when money was added. It also took into account the size and timing of donations, even measuring the effects of political donations that are made while a case is pending before the court. It also measured the additional advantage obtained by the “net contributor” who contributed a larger political donation than the other side. The statistical correlations indicate that the higher the donation, the higher the odds that the contributor's position will prevail. The data indicate that judicial voting favors plaintiffs' or defendants' positions not on the basis of judicial leaning or philosophical orientation but on the basis of the size and timing of a political donation.
These results, the Authors submit, draw into question the voting behavior of Louisiana's highest court.
About the Author
Vernon Valentine Palmer. Thomas Pickles Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Eason-Weinmann Center of Comparative Law, Tulane University. B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Tulane University; LL.M. 1966, Yale University; D. Phil. 1985, Pembroke College, Oxford University.
John Levendis. Professor of Economics, Loyola University New Orleans. B.B.A. 1997, Loyola University New Orleans; M.A. 2000, M.S. 2003, Ph.D. 2004, University of Iowa.
Citation
82 Tul. L. Rev. 1291 (2008)