Comment by Evan P. Lestelle
International treaties, as well as decisions of domestic courts and international tribunals, demonstrate that norms against foreign public bribery are firmly rooted in international law. This Comment argues that in order for global efforts of minimizing the effects of foreign public bribery to succeed, the United States and other nations dominating the “supply side” of foreign public bribery must at times pursue long-reaching or even extraterritorial enforcement of antibribery norms.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the antibribery and jurisdictional provisions of two important instruments in the global struggle against corruption: the FCPA and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). This Part also discusses examples from the recent trend of increased FCPA enforcement, demonstrating that U.S. regulators may be acting on infirm jurisdictional grounds. Part III discusses the humanitarian nature of international norms against the supply side of foreign public bribery and the pervasive nature of the crime. Such characteristics can be analogized to those of the weightiest international crimes, including jus cogens crimes. Both positive and natural sources of international law commonly grant expansive, extraterritorial jurisdiction for jus cogens crimes. Part III argues that the characteristics foreign public bribery shares with such crimes necessitates supporting the prosecution of foreign public bribery with more expansive jurisdiction. Finally, Part IV concludes that the “bribe-supplying nations” should amend the UNCAC, the world's most robust and substantial antibribery convention, to provide for limited extraterritorial jurisdiction to pursue violations of norms against foreign public bribery.
About the Author
Evan P. Lestelle. J.D. candidate 2009, Tulane University School of Law; B.A. 2004, Duke University.
Citation
83 Tul. L. Rev. 527 (2008)