Article by Keiran McCluskie
In Knight v. Kirby Offshore Marine Pacific, L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit reorganized its precedent to align with a proper reading of the Jones Act in distinguishing between general and specific orders. The court's prior jurisprudence indicated that a seaman could not be held comparatively negligent when carrying out a superior's orders, even if they were aware of possible danger and did not consider safer alternatives to their means of execution. In Knight, however, the Fifth Circuit denied that its precedent provided this exception and instead adopted the general-specific order rule. Thus, seamen following general orders could still be comparatively negligent, but those following specific orders were exempt from negligence. The new ruling is of important consequence to maritime workers, as it seems to both limit their ability to claim damages and heighten their responsibility to act with care when performing tasks.
This Comment discusses how the new approach by Knight incorporates a correct textual interpretation of the Jones Act by only exempting seamen from comparative negligence when they are following a specific order. Part II provides background information on courts' interpretations of the Jones Act and its provisions on comparative negligence and assumption of risk. Part III analyzes how federal courts of appeal have analyzed a seaman's comparative negligence when they are following orders. Part IV details the Fifth Circuit's conflicting precedent on whether a seaman can be comparatively negligent while following an order, and then reviews the Fifth Circuit's decision and reasoning in Knight. Part V explains how Knight's move to a general-specific order paradigm aligns with a more legally accurate reading of the Jones Act and why it creates a fairer practical policy for seamen and employers alike. Part VI briefly concludes.
About the Author
Keiran McCluskie, J.D. candidate 2023 Tulane University Law School; B.A. 2020 University of New Orleans. I would first like to thank Professor Martin Davies for his insight, feedback, and encouragement whilst developing this Comment. I also give my gratitude to my colleagues at the Tulane Law Review, whose efforts and endeavors are an enduring inspiration. I dedicate this Comment to my parents, James C. McCluskie and Olga McCluskie, for their loving support and unwavering encouragement to pursue everything in my life with determination and no regrets.
Citation
97 Tul. L. Rev. 489