Some rights are more favored--and some rights are more disfavored--than others. The right to self-representation is a disfavored right. Despite its historic roots, the right has been subjected to judicially imposed limits that have reduced its scope. The limits on the right to self-representation include restrictions on the type of litigant that can avail themselves of the right, bars regarding the personal characteristics of litigants, barriers on the types of assistance a pro se litigant may receive, and procedural limitations on how a litigant may invoke the right.
This Article is the first to study these established limitations on the right to appear pro se and consider how those limits will impact litigants who seek to use new artificial intelligence technology to assist them in their court proceedings. I contend that a litigant who seeks to appear pro se with the assistance of artificial intelligence would implicate the same concerns that resulted in the implementation of these historically established parameters of the right to self-representation. I then provide a framework for how courts should address this technology when it--inevitably--appears in courtrooms alongside pro se litigants.
About the Author
Jessica R. Gunder, Associate Clinical Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. Thank you to Tim Murphy and Susan Hunt for their valuable feedback. Additionally, I am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Idaho for their numerous insights and unwavering support for this project.
Citation
98 Tul. L. Rev. 363