Using a vague framework to interpret a complicated statute is like playing pin the tail on the donkey--chances of success are unpredictable. When the court in Cela v. Garland narrowly interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), it denied Tiger Cela his only chance to gain permanent residence in the United States. Cela, an Albanian native, was granted derivative asylum based on his father's asylum application in 2012. In 2016, Cela pled guilty to and was convicted of two crimes. Three years later, an immigration judge (IJ) granted the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) request to revoke Cela's asylum status due to his convictions.
DHS then began removal proceedings against Cela. Cela responded by applying to adjust his status under § 1159(b), which allows asylees a route to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR)--colloquially known as a green card holder. Due to the termination of his asylee status, the IJ found Cela ineligible for an adjustment to LPR status under § 1159(b). The IJ ordered Cela's removal to Albania. Cela appealed his decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA found that § 1159(b) “[did] not reveal whether Congress clearly intended adjustment of status ... to be available to respondents whose asylee status ha[d] been terminated.” Finding § 1159(b) ambiguous under the statutory interpretation framework of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the members of the BIA panel attempted to ascribe a meaning to the statute but were divided in their result. Two panel members asserted that § 1159(b) did not apply to noncitizens whose asylum status had been terminated, while the third panel member disagreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the statute was clear and that prior termination of a noncitizen's asylum status rendered them ineligible for adjustment under § 1159(b). Thus, denying Cela a petition to review his eligibility for adjustment to LPR.
The Fourth Circuit's narrow interpretation of § 1159(b) relied upon arbitrary tools of statutory construction and deviated from Congress's intentions for the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The United States Supreme Court urges courts to apply tools of statutory interpretation to analyze a statute before declaring it ambiguous; however, it has not provided a framework for how courts should apply such rules. As a result, the Cela court constructed an arbitrary hierarchy of interpretation tools to ascribe meaning to § 1159. In Cela, the Fourth Circuit considered the definition of the statute's plain words rather than historical context or the neighboring provisions of the INA. This Note closely examines the court's interpretation of § 1159(b), which limits adjustment eligibility only to those with present asylum status. Part II provides an overview of key doctrines and case law pertinent to statutory interpretation broadly and explains how federal courts have analyzed § 1159(b). Part III discusses the Fourth Circuit's novel interpretation of § 1159(b) and the relevant legal authority it used to justify its decision. Part IV analyzes the consequences and practical impact of the court's decision. Part V briefly concludes.
About the Author
Yael Pasumansky, J.D. Candidate 2025, Tulane University Law School; B.A. 2022, Tulane University.
Citation
98 Tul. L. Rev. 773