The core of this legal framework is the recognition of a unique and meaningful emotional bond between humans and their companion animals. It does not seek to elevate animals to the status of human beings or to take them out of the current property classification. Instead, it creates a new cause of action based on their unique position--tortious harm to a companion animal--and proposes to limit liability through the creation of judicial tools, such as factors for the jury to assess the existence and extent of damages of noneconomic injuries and statutory caps on the recovery of noneconomic damages. These proposed liability limitation tools are based on public policy, legal reasoning, science, and current moral values concerning companion animals. Ultimately, this Article aims to create a reasonable legal path to recovery of damages when companion animals are intentionally or negligently harmed, and the owner suffers emotional injuries from the unexpected disruption of a meaningful relationship. It delineates a “how-to” that moves from the mere recognition of such a relationship to a contemporary reform that derives from sound public policy and law principles.
Part II gives an overview of the status of companion animals in the legal system and society. Part III discusses the treatment of animals in tort law and the different approaches utilized by different states; explores examples of how some areas of the law have started to step away from the property frame to treat companion animals more like family members; and delves into public policy considerations alluded to by courts and scholars in opposition to the expansion of damages in companion animal cases. Lastly, Part III proposes a statutory model suggesting that noneconomic damages are awarded based on the existence of a meaningful human-companion-animal relationship. It proposes a new cause of action, defines who can recover damages, and suggests the criteria for an animal to be considered a companion animal for recovery purposes. In addition, this Part delineates the standards that will limit liability to assure that the court system, and the defendants are not unreasonably burdened in providing compensation.
About the Author
Angie Vega, Animal Law Fellow, Michigan State University, LL.B., Universidad Javeriana, Cali, Colombia, April 2015; LL.M. in the American Legal System, Michigan State University College of Law, December 2017. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to colleagues and supervisors who generously offered their valuable suggestions and feedback throughout the process of refining this Article. I want to extend a special note of appreciation to Rebecca Wisch, Prof. David Favre, Prof. Brian Kalt, Emily Holley, and Ann Griffin for their expertise and insightful comments, which significantly enhanced the clarity and strength of the arguments presented in this work.
Citation
98 Tul. L. Rev. 961